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UNEP Scientific Mission to Kosovo. (2000). Depleted uranium in kosovo post-conflict environmental assessment. Retrieved from http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/uranium.pdf
Depleted Uranium in Kosovo
What is DU?
Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of the process used to enrich natural uranium ore for use in nuclear reactors and in nuclear weapons. It is distinguished from natural uranium by differing concentrations of certain uranium isotopes. Natural uranium has a uranium-235 (abbreviated as U-235 or 235U) content of 0.7%, whereas the content of U-235 in DU is depleted to about one third of its original content (0.2 – 0.3%).Depleted uranium (DU) was one the issues that confronted analysts during the environmental assessment work done in the summer of 1999.
The UNEP studies in Kosovo showed that the material in the DU penetrators found there also contained traces of transuranic isotopes such as uranium-236 and plutonium-239/240 which are created during nuclear reactions. This indicates that at least part of the material in the penetrators had originated from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel. However, the amounts of these isotopes were very low and not significant in terms of the overall radioactivity of penetrators.
After the 1999 conflict ended, a special international group of experts called the “Depleted Uranium Desk Assessment Group,” was established to assess the potential effects on human health and the environment arising from the possible use of DU. While the group made its assessments, information on the use of depleted uranium during the Kosovo conflict was not available to the UN. The Group did, however, conduct a field mission in August 1999, during which it visited areas in and around the towns of Pristina, Klina and Pec that might have been struck by DU ordnance. The field mission, however, did not find any evidence or indication of depleted uranium at the locations visited. In preparing precautionary recommendations, the Group concluded that it would not be meaningful to conduct further field searches for possible DU contamination without confirmation that DU had indeed been used in Kosovo and without data on the corresponding targeted areas.
Following a request made to NATO by the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan, in October 1999, NATO confirmed in February 2000 the use of DU during the Kosovo conflict and provided the UN with information consisting of a general map indicating the areas targeted and the total number of DU rounds fired. This information was not considered sufficient to justify a further field mission because of the absence of detailed site coordinates.
A request for additional information was made to NATO by the UN Secretary General. InJuly 2000, NATO provided the UN with a detailed map indicating sites where DU munitions had been used. This was accompanied by a table of coordinates for each of 112 attacks during which DU ammunition had been used, together with the number of rounds used in each case, where this latter information was known.
This additional information was reviewed at a meeting convened by UNEP in Geneva in September 2000. The meeting recommended that UNEP, in close cooperation with relevant UN partner agencies and other interested parties, conduct a field study on sites in Kosovo that were struck by DU ordnance, as early as possible, preferably in autumn of that year.
A field mission was carried out from 5 – 19 November 2000, by a team composed of 14 experts from inter-governmental agencies, well-known institutions, and other interested parties. Additional cooperation was received from NATO, KFOR and UNMIK. During the mission, soil, water and other samples were collected and sent for analysis to five laboratories well reputed in matters of radiological or toxicological analysis. The use of several laboratories allowed comparison of different methods for assessing impacts.
Sampling in some areas was limited by the fact that the sites had not been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. Sampling occurred at approximately 12% of the total number of DU-targeted sites listed by NATO.
Experience obtained in the field suggested that the site coordinates provided by NATO were accurate. Measurements taken during the August 1999 field mission – which had no information on the exact sites where DU had been used – did not detect any elevated levels of radiation. During the November 2000 field mission, no evidence was found of DU presence outside of the NATO-listed sites. UNEP field experience also supports the information provided by NATO on the type of DU ammunition used. There are no indications of the use of any other type of DU ammunition in Kosovo.
Nevertheless, even after one and a half years had elapsed since the conflict, the UNEP team found slightly radioactive material at many sites, including the penetrator and jacket parts of DU ammunition.
The samples collected around the sites where DU ordnance had been used show that DU dust is also measurable near the targeted sites. Even if alarming environmental risks do not now exist at these sites, UNEP recommends several precautionary measures – among others, marking the DU sites and decontaminating them when possible. In the areas most at risk of groundwater contamination, we recommend the monitoring of the water quality.
Notes on Table 3.1: the columns of figures represent the number of samples in each category from each site. The number of contamination points located, the numbers of penetrators and jackets found, and the approximate number of DU rounds fired against the site, are also shown.‘Contamination points’ are those very localised areas, often holes in the road, which were identified as being DU-contaminated, but at which no penetrator or jacket was found. In addition, the soil underneath any penetrators and jackets located was most often shown to be contaminated. All penetrators and jackets were removed from the sites.
Apart from concern over the possible impacts of DU on local populations and the field staff of international organisations, there has also been considerable concern over the possible impacts of DU on military personnel. Three specific situations should be taken into account. First, the additional risks – beyond the obvious ones – of being at or very close to the site of an area under attack by DU. Clearly this circumstance could not have been investigated within the scope of the UNEP mission, some 18 months after the conflict had ended. Secondly, during the clean-up of targeted sites, loose contamination mightpose a risk, thereby requiring protective measures – especially when entering partly destroyed armoured vehicles. No such vehicles were present at the sites visited by UNEP in November 2000 and it is therefore likely that military clean-up had already taken place. UNEP has no information of the removal or possible current locations of any DU-damaged vehicles from the visited sites.The third situation concerns mine clearance at sites where DU has been used. There are significant parts of Kosovo that have yet to be de-mined and cleared of unexploded ordnance, including areas that were targeted with DU. De-mining is sometimes carried out by exploding the mines, which could lead to increased exposure to DU fragments and dust.
DU is certainly not the main environmental problem in Kosovo at the moment. Nevertheless, it is an additional negative factor in the equation, and action should be taken to eliminate all possible risks to the environment. It is important that the military organisations, NATO and KFOR, continue to take part in the elimination of all DU-related risks, particularly as many of the DU sites remain at risk from mines and other unexploded ordnance.
Findings and Effects of DU
Small penetrator fragments and DU dust are gradually transported into the upper soil layer by water, insects and worms. Wind, rainwater, or surface water flow may also redistribute the dust. Due to the varying chemical properties of different soils and rocks, the effects of buried penetrators on the environment will also vary. The mobilization of DU in the soil profile and its possible contamination of groundwater will depend on a range of factors such as the chemistry and structure of the surrounding soil, rainfall and hydrology.
The effects of being exposed to DU are both radiological (i.e. due to radiation) and chemical (i.e. as a result of biochemical effects in the human body). Corresponding health consequences may, depending upon the dose or intake, include cancer and malfunction of body organs, particularly the kidneys.
There are reasons to believe that the chemical and physical properties of DU make it more liable to dispersion in soil than is the case for natural uranium. The issue of DU dispersion into the ground is also of particular relevance in judging the risk of future contamination of groundwater and, ultimately, drinking water supplies.
Risks
Penetrators on the surface of the ground can be picked up by people. One possible consequence is contamination of the hands. Another possible consequence is the external beta radiation on the skin if a person put the penetrator in his or her pocket or used it as an ornament on a neck chain. This could mean a continuous exposure of skin, leading to quite high local radiation doses (in excess 22of radiation safety guidelines) after some weeks of continuous exposure, even though there will not be any skin burns from radiation. The resulting gamma radiation exposure will be insignificant and, at most, of the same order of magnitude as natural radiation.
Penetrators on the surface and particularly those in the ground may dissolve in time and slowly contaminate the groundwater and the drinking water.
Nevertheless, the radiation doses will be very low but the resulting uranium concentration might exceed WHO health standards for drinking water. However, that very much depends on local circumstances and the chemical and physical properties of the DU penetrators, soil and groundwater. There are too many uncertainties to predict the fate of the penetrators and even more uncertainties in predicting any possible water contamination in the future.
DU in Water
In all, 46 water samples were taken and analysed in laboratories. They were taken from 10 of the 11 sites. The uranium concentration varies from 6.5 10-6 to 2.15 10-3 mg U/kg water. There are no signs of DU in water.
Milk
Milk samples were taken from three sites and from cows that grazed in potentially contaminated fields. None showed any DU contamination.
Conclusions reached
1. There was no detectable, widespread contamination of the ground surface by depleted uranium. This means that any widespread contamination is present in such low levels that it cannot be detected or differentiated from the natural uranium concentration found in rocks and soil. The corresponding radiological and toxicological risks are insignificant and even non-existent.
2. Detectable ground surface contamination by DU is limited to areas within a few metres of penetrators and localised points of concentrated contamination (‘contamination points’) caused by penetrator impacts. A number of contamination points were identified by the mission but most of these were found to be only slightly contaminated. The majority ofthe radioactivity was attached to the surrounding asphalt, concrete or soil, with some attached to the loose sand present in some penetrator holes. In many cases, the radioactivity was so low that it was hardly detectable.
3. There is no significant risk related to these contamination points in terms of possible contamination of air, water or plants. The only risk of any significance would be that someone touched the contamination point, thereby contaminating their hands (with a risk of subsequent transfer to the mouth), or directly ingested the contaminated soil. However, with reasonable assumptions on intake of soil, the corresponding radiological risk would be insignificant, while from a toxicological point of view, the possible intake might be somewhat higher than the applicable health standards.
4. No DU-contaminated water, milk, objects, or buildings were found.
5. Seven and a half penetrators and six jackets were found during the two-week mission. The fact that no more were found, in spite of intensive searching, may mean that:26
– other penetrators are not on the surface but buried in the ground;
– they are spread over a larger area than assumed;
– they have already been picked up, for instance during military site clean-up or mine clearance.
6. There are probably still penetrators lying on the ground surface. If picked up they could contaminate hands. However, the probable intake into the body is small and both the radiological and toxicological risks are likely to be insignificant.
7. If a penetrator is put into the pocket or elsewhere close to the human body, there will be external beta radiation of the skin. That can lead to local radiation doses above safety standards after some weeks of continuous exposure. Even so, it is unlikely that there will be any adverse health effects from such an exposure.
8. Penetrators oxidise and the outermost layer of the surface of the penetrator can then be removed easily and thereby contaminate its surroundings. Some DU has dispersed into theground beneath penetrators and jackets lying on the surface and is measurable to a depth of 10 – 20 cm.
9. It is probable that many penetrators and jackets are hidden at some metres depth in the ground. These penetrators and jackets as well as those on the ground surface, constitute a risk of future DU contamination of groundwater and drinking water. Heavy firing of DU in one area could increase the potential source of uranium contamination of groundwater by a factor of 10 to 100. While the radiation doses will be very low, the resulting uranium concentration might exceed WHO health standards for drinking water.
10. However, there are too many uncertainties to predict the future levels of groundwater contamination with any reliability. To reduce these uncertainties, it would be valuable to undertake a mission to areas where DU was used at an earlier time than in Kosovo, e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina where buried or surface DU ordnance has persisted in the environment for 5-6 years.
11. Hidden penetrators and jackets may be dug up to the ground surface in the future. The corresponding risks are than the same as for penetrators and jackets now lying on the surface.
12. The uranium isotope U-236 and the plutonium isotopes Pu-239/240 were present in the depleted uranium of those penetrators analysed in very small concentrations and do not pose a significant risk.
13. There are signs that some plant material, such as lichen, and possibly bark, may be good environmental indicators of DU. The preliminary results should be verified by additional analysis.
14. The sites visited by the UNEP mission represent some 12% of all sites attacked using DU ammunition during the Kosovo conflict. Based on the mission’s findings, it is possible to make certain extrapolations for other DU-affected sites in Kosovo, but also for sites in Serbia (about 10% of sites targeted with DU) and Montenegro (amounting to approximately 2% of sites targeted with DU), where there are similar circumstances and environmental conditions, and which had been targeted by DU ammunition during the same conflict. However, further work would be needed to confirm the validity of such extrapolation.
UNEP Scientific Mission to Kosovo. (2000). Depleted uranium in kosovo post-conflict environmental assessment. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/du/finalreport.pdf
What is depleted Uranium
“Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of the process used to enrich natural uranium ore
for use in nuclear reactors and in nuclear weapons”
“The UNEP studies in Kosovo showed that the material in the DU penetrators found there
also contained traces of transuranic isotopes such as uranium-236 and plutonium-239/240
which are created during nuclear reactions.”
“However, the amounts of these isotopes were very low and not significant in terms of the overall radioactivity of penetrators.”
“During the Kosovo conflict, DU weapons were fired from NATO aircraft, and it has been reported that over 30,000 rounds of DU were used (UNEP, 2000).”
UNEP/UNCHS. (21, March 2001). Nato used du during kosovo conflict *. Retrieved from http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/dunato.htm*\\
“NATO confirms to the united nations, use of depleted uranium during the Kosovo conflict”
"DU rounds were used whenever the A-10 engaged armor during Operation Allied Force. Therefore, it was used throughout Kosovo during approximately 100 missions”
“A total of approximately 31,000 rounds of DU ammunition were used in operation Allied Force”
“The major focus of these operations was in an area west of the Pec-Dakovica-Prizren highway; in the area surrounding Klina; in the area around Prizren; and in an area to the north of a line joining Suva Reka and Urosevac”
*Mario , B. (2000). The risks of depleted uranium contamination post-conflict: unep assessments. Retrieved from http://unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2760.pdf*
“Uranium 238 in the soil, plants and sporadically even in urine of certain individuals, from the
region Vranje-Bujanovac (Bratoselce) have been evidenced. Radioactive contamination level
was low, within the small dose range, incapable to produce evident clinical picture of the
irradiation disease. The risk of the continuous effects of the low doses includes accelerated
ageing and greater probability of development of mutations that may be cause of certain
diseases or malformations, leading to reduced life expectancy of the population in the
contaminated regjion”
“Second, penetrators buried near the ground surface and recovered by UNEP had decreased in mass by
approximately 25 % over 7 years. Based on this finding, correlated with those penetrators studied in UNEP’s earlier studies, a DU penetrator can be fully oxidized to corrosion products (e.g. uranium oxides and carbonates) in 25 to 35 years after impact. Following time period, no more penetrators – metallic DU – will be found buried in the Balkans soil. In contrast, penetrators lying on the ground surface showed significantly lower corrosion rates.”
“DU is toxic for humans and animals. Although it is considered less radioactive than natural
uranium, its toxicity is high due to high linear energetic transfer (LET) irradiation, tissue
deposition (bones, kidneys, blood, lungs) and elimination time (5,000 days)”